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The third matter that must be proved is causation. C not only has to prove that damage occurred, but must also prove D was the cause of that damage, both in fact and in law.
The courts ask whether ‘but for’ D’s breach of
duty would the harm have occurred?
If the answer is “no” then D is liable. However, if the damage
would have happened regardless of the negligent act or omission, D
will not be liable for it.
In Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington HMC, 1968,
(another case of medical negligence) a man died of arsenic poisoning
after being sent home from hospital without being examined. The
hospital was not liable because he would have died regardless of
whether he had been treated.
In cases where there is more than one possible cause, a claim could fail if causation could not be proved in respect of any particular D. In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, 2002, the HL made clear that the ‘but for’ test is necessary but not always conclusive, and modified the rules.
Key case
The facts of Fairchild were that C became ill after exposure to asbestos dust in the course of successive employments. The CA had held that he could not recover damages from any of the employers, since he could not establish which period of employment had caused his illness. This seemed unfair to C, because each of the employers could be shown to be in breach of duty. It just wasn’t clear which particular breach was the cause of the illness. The HL reversed the CA’s decision and held that if C could show that D had ‘materially increased the risk’ of harm then the causation test could be satisfied. In Barker v Corus 2006, the HL said that in such cases damages should be apportioned between the D’s.
If the loss or damage is not foreseeable it is
said to be ‘too remote’ from the breach.
This was established in The Wagon Mound, 1961 (full
name Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering
Co, 1961), where oil which was negligently spilt by the Ds
caused a fire that damaged C’s wharf two days later.
They were not liable because it was not believed that this type of
oil could catch fire on water. The damage to the dock by oil was
foreseeable, so this could be claimed for, but not damage caused by
the later fire. That damage was too ‘remote’ because D is only
liable for the foreseeable consequences of any breach of duty.
Task: Apply causation in fact and law to the facts of Donoghue
Make some notes on a piece of paper and then click here.
Answer: One can say that ‘but for’ the manufacturer’s negligence in allowing a snail to get into the bottle Mrs Donoghue would not have suffered harm. There are no other possible causes so the manufacturer has in fact caused the harm. It is also foreseeable that allowing a snail, or any other contaminants, into a bottle of ginger beer will cause harm to the consumer of that beer, so causation in law is also proved.
Sometimes something happens between D’s negligent
act and C’s injury. This is referred to by the Latin tag ‘novus
actus interveniens’ or in modern parlance, ‘new act
intervening’. Such an act may sometimes break the chain of
causation between D’s act or omission and the harm to C.
In Smith v Littlewoods 1987, an owner of a disused
cinema had left his property unsecured and vandals broke in. They
caused a fire which spread to a neighbour’s property. The neighbour
sued the cinema owner. The claim failed. D successfully argued
that the act of the vandals had broken the chain between the
omission (not locking up properly) and the damage.
An example of the argument failing can be seen in a case we looked
at earlier, Reeves v MPC. The police argued that
the prisoner’s suicide was an intervening act, which broke the chain
of causation. The HL did not accept this.
If the type of damage is foreseeable, then the fact that it occurred in an unforeseeable way, or that the consequences were more extensive than could be foreseen, will not affect liability. In Hughes v Lord Advocate 1963, a child knocked over a paraffin lamp which caused an explosion. He was very badly burnt. The court found that the type of injury was foreseeable (burns) even though the way this had occurred (an explosion) was not. D was liable.
The principles of both The Wagon Mound and Hughes were confirmed by the HL in Jolley v Sutton LBC, 2000.
Key case
In Jolley, a 14-year-old boy was
badly injured when working with a friend on an abandoned and
derelict boat on council land. The CA had held that although it may
be foreseeable that children might play on such a boat, it was not
foreseeable that they would attempt to repair it, so the council
were not liable.
The HL reversed the decision and made the point that the ingenuity
of children ‘should not be underestimated’. It was
foreseeable that children would meddle with the boat in some way and
this was enough; it did not matter that they had been repairing it
rather than playing on it.

This is a common law rule that D must take the
victim as he or she is found.
It is called the ‘thin’ or ‘egg shell’ skull rule because it applies
where V is more vulnerable to harm than other people. It means that
if the victim suffers greater harm, or even dies, due to having a
particular disability, D is still liable, even though a person
without that disability would not have been so seriously harmed.
An example is Smith v Leech Brain, 1962, where an
employer’s negligence caused a small burn, which activated a latent
cancer from which an employee died. His wife sued the employer and
the court held that his particular vulnerability (the pre-existing
cancer) did not affect liability.
Task: Click here to do two small exercises.
Note that foreseeability comes into all 3 areas, but becomes more specific at each stage.
| Duty | was it foreseeable that someone might be harmed by D’s actions? Donoghue / Caparo |
| Breach | was the risk of harm foreseeable? Roe / Bolton |
| Causation | was the type of harm foreseeable? The Wagon Mound / Hughes / Jolley |
Having revised the law in relation to duty for physical harm you should now be ready to see how it applies to cases where the harm is not physical, but is either economic or psychiatric. The law on breach and causation applies to these areas in the same way as it does for cases of physical harm; it is only the duty of care that is different.
As a final task look back at the three diagrams on duty, breach and causation and make one of your own with all three together, adding a case for each point. Keep this for revision purposes.
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Jolley v Sutton LBC